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Abstract
In this study we investigate empirically the relationship between own-
ership structure of Belgian listed ﬁrms, and their performance measured
by Tobin’s Q. We focus on the management and the largest shareholders
equity ownership. We use ﬁrst a cross-sectional estimation from 1991 to
1996. Second, we use panel data estimation to control whether the results
found cross-sectionally are not due to unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity. The
use of panel data conﬁrms the results obtained cross-sectionally for man-
agerial ownership, that is, the relationship between the fraction of equities
held by managers and Tobin’s Q is negative. However, panel data results
for the relationship between largest shareholders equities ownership and
Tobin’s Q become positive, while it is negative cross-sectionally. These
results indicate that there is ﬁrm heterogeneity which is not captured in
the cross-section estimation.
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11 Introduction
This study is in the line of the agency theory literature dealing with the principal-
agent problem. In this literature the separation of ownership and control cre-
ates agency costs, because of the information asymmetries between managers
and shareholders. The utility functions of managers, who are in control, on one
hand and shareholders on the other hand are not the same. Berle and Means
(1932) raised the problem of the potential conﬂict of interest between managers
in control and dispersed shareholders in widely held US corporations. However,
this view is valid for widely held corporations, in economies with diﬀused owner-
ship [Becht and R¨ oel (1999)]. Indeed, contrarily to what is observed in the USA
and UK, continental European countries are characterized by the high level of
ownership concentration in the hands of a small number of shareholders, Bel-
gium being a prime example. The conﬂict of interests is in this case no longer
between managers and dispersed shareholders, but between large shareholders
detaining eﬀective control and the other shareholders. A number of studies
have emphasized the ownership concentration and the role of large shareholders
in monitoring managers and the enforcement for value maximization, instead
of other mechanisms [Yarrow (1976), Aoki (1983), Leech (1987), Wruck (1989),
Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog (1997), Renneboog (1996), and Yafeh and Yosha
(1995)].
The study of the Belgian case add another contribution to the recent liter-
ature dealing with diﬀerent aspects of corporate governance around the world
[Bebchuk (1999), Becht and R¨ oel (1999), La Porta, et al., (1997), La Porta, et
al., (1999), La Porta, et al., (2000a), La Porta, et al., (2000b), and Shleifer and
Vishny (1997)]. Furthermore, even if Belgium is a small economy, it is worthily
to study because it reﬂects very well the practices of corporate governance in
the majority of the continental European countries.
In this paper we are interested, ﬁrstly in the eﬀect of managerial ownership
on the ﬁrm’s value, as the studies done for USA corporations [Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes
(1990)]. Secondly, we also aim to investigate the eﬀect of the largest shareholders
ownership on ﬁrm’s value, given the high level of ownership concentration in
Belgian listed ﬁrms.
Concerning the eﬀect of managerial ownership on ﬁrm’s value, Berle and
Means’s (1932) seminal work gave rise to a substantial body of literature. Be-
side the theoretical literature on the objectives and the behaviour of managers
in running corporations for other shareholders, there are several other US em-
pirical studies testing this relationship. At the European level there are not
readily comparable empirical studies, on ownership structure and ﬁrm’s value,
to those done for US corporations. This may ﬁnd its explanations in part for
reasons of data availability. EGCN’s1 report (1997) raised the severe problem of
1European Corporate Governance Network.
2lack of data in European countries concerning the ownership disclosure and the
availability of taped data. With this study, we want to make a contribution to
the empirical literature dealing with the relationship between managerial own-
ership and ﬁrm performance for a continental European country, using Tobin’s
Q as a measure of performance. Furthermore, we want to see what is the eﬀect
of the largest shareholders’ ownership on ﬁrm performance.
On the theoretical side, the literature considers two hypothesis. The man-
agerial alignment hypothesis, and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Ac-
cording to the managerial alignment hypothesis, managers have an incentive or
are compelled to value maximization. The incentives that make managers align
their interests to those of small shareholders are managerial equity ownership
in the ﬁrm [Lewellen (1969), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Benston (1985)].
However, managerial ownership could also have a controversial eﬀect, which is
to make them too risk-averse. Hence, the performance could be lower in ﬁrms
with higher managerial equity ownership [Fama and Jensen (1983)]. In Stulz
(1988) study, managers’ maximization of the ﬁrm’s value depends on the frac-
tion of voting rights they have. The value of a ﬁrm, which is a takeover target,
increases and as the voting rights become more concentrated in the hands of
managers it decreases. If managers have ﬁfty percent or more of voting rights
in the ﬁrm, and if they always oppose a hostile takeover, the value of outside
shares decreases. Hence, in the high range of management ownership there is no
convergence of interests between managers and dispersed shareholders. If man-
agers do not have an ownership interest in the ﬁrm there are other forces that
compel them to value maximization2. According to the managerial entrench-
ment hypothesis managers are supposed to be able to make speciﬁc investments
in order to increase their value to shareholders and to be costly to replace as
shown in Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
On the empirical side, there are several US studies investigating empirically
the issue of the relationship between ownership structure, especially managers’
ownership, and ﬁrm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) tested empiri-
cally the relationship between accounting proﬁt rate of 511 US companies in
1980, and ownership concentration3 and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant correlation4. Con-
trarily, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990),
using a cross-sectional speciﬁcation, ﬁnd a signiﬁcant non-linear relationship be-
tween management ownership and performance as proxied by Tobin’s Q. Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) have run piecewise linear OLS regressions for 371
large industrial ﬁrms of the Fortune 500 in 1980 allowing the coeﬃcients on
2This compulsion comes from the managerial labor market, [Fama (1980), Martin and
McConnell (1990)], by the product market [Hart (1983)], by the monitoring of the board of
directors [Fama and Jensen (1983)], or by the threat of a hostile takeover, [Marris (1963),
Jensen and Ruback (1983), Scharfstein (1988)].
3Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of shares held by the top ﬁve
shareholders, the percentage of shares held by the top twenty shareholders, and by the Herﬁnd-
ahl index.
4They used a linear speciﬁcation.
3the ownership variable to change slope at 5 percent and 25 percent. Their re-
sults indicate a positive relationship between ownership and Tobin’ Q in the
0 to 5 percent board ownership range, a negative relation in the 5 to 25 per-
cent range, and a positive relation beyond on 25 percent level. In the study
of McConnell and Servaes (1990) investigating the relationship between perfor-
mance and insiders ownership for 1173 ﬁrms in 1976 and 1093 ﬁrms in 1986,
they ﬁnd a curvilinear relationship between Q and insiders ownership, Q ﬁrst
increases then decreases as the fraction of shares held by insiders becomes more
concentrated. Conclusions of these two papers are the same concerning the fact
that the relationship between insiders’ ownership and Q is not linear. However,
Mc Connell and Servaes (1990) were unable to replicate Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1988) speciﬁcation. A mention has to be made to the study of Leech
and Leahy (1991) about UK-listed ﬁrms, where they used a linear speciﬁcation
of ownership concentration and found a negative linear relationship.
The contribution of our study is to investigate empirically what is the rela-
tionship between managerial ownership and ﬁrm performance, for a continental
European country, given that no study has been conducted for European coun-
tries. A speciﬁty of our study is that our estimation is for a much longer period,
from 1991 to 1996. While, for Demsezt and Lenh (1985) it was only for one
period, for Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) it was for three periods, and for
McConnell and Servaes (1990) it was for two periods. Another diﬀerence be-
tween our study and the American ones, is that these studies use cross-sectional
estimation. Whereas, in our study we ﬁrst use cross-sectional estimation, and
then panel data model to see whether there is ﬁrm heterogeneity, which is not
captured cross-sectionally. Himmelberg et al. (1999), presented empirical evi-
dence, showing that the cross-sectional results in Morck et al,. (1988) and Mc
Connell and Servaes (1990) are due to a spurious correlation, because of unob-
served ﬁrm eﬀects. Himmelberg et al. (1999), use panel data to show that there
are ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects that are not captured in the cross-sectional speciﬁcation.
Other studies used panel data speciﬁcations to show the limits of cross-sectional
estimations [B¨ orsch and K¨ oke (2000)]. This study makes a contribution given
that the characteristics of corporate ownership traditions are completely diﬀer-
ent in USA and in Europe. The fact that the features of corporate ownership
traditions are diﬀerent in USA and Europe has been highlighted recently by the
literature on corporate governance and law. La Porta et al., (1999) identify the
ultimate controlling shareholders of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies.
They show that dispersed ownership is far from universal, and that widely held
corporations appears to be relatively uncommon, except in economies with very
good shareholder protection. In contrast, family control5 is very common, par-
ticularly through the use of pyramids. This control is signiﬁcant and typically
unchallenged by other equity holders. They ﬁnd empirical evidence that com-
5They used 20 percent of equity ownership as the criterion for control for a sample of the
20 largest ﬁrms (by stock market capitalization of equity at the end of 1995) in 27 countries.
There is more ownership concentration when they soften the control to 10 percent control
chain.
4mon law countries tend to have better protection of minority shareholders than
civil law countries. Burkart et al., (1997) emphasize the link between ownership
concentration and the weak legal protection of small shareholders. In the case
of weak legal protection the large shareholder has more incentives to monitor,
because there is a greater expropriation threat. This in turn reduces the man-
ager’s incentive to exert eﬀort because he is less likely to extract (large) private
beneﬁts. When monitoring is successful, the large shareholder decides whether
to pay out proceeds or whether to divert resources and share the private bene-
ﬁts with the manager. In Pagano and R¨ oell (1998), the large shareholders who
detain eﬀective control are controlled by other large shareholders. However,
the empirical results6 of La Porta et al., (1999) do not support Pagano and
R¨ oell (1998) hypothesis that controlling shareholders are usually monitored by
other large shareholders. Large shareholders of all kinds, including families are
typically alone7.
Given the high level of ownership concentration in Belgian listed ﬁrms, we
consider also the eﬀect of the largest shareholders’ ownership on ﬁrm perfor-
mance. We estimate this relationship cross-sectionally as well as in panel data.
In this regard we diﬀer from the studies done for the US, which were interested
in the eﬀect of the control exercised by managers on performance and ignored
the eﬀect of the control exercised by the largest shareholders. In this study
we present more evidence on corporate ownership in a continental European
country.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we expose the main fea-
tures of corporate ownership in Belgium. Section three, presents the empirical
methodology used. In section four, we present Tobin’s Q as a measure of per-
formance and discuss the method to compute it. In section ﬁve, we describe
the data. In section six we present our empirical results, and section seven
concludes.
2 Belgian Corporate Ownership
In this section we aim to point out ﬁrst, special characteristics of Belgian cor-
porate ownership. Second, we want to focus on the adoption, in 1989, of the
disclosure law, because before this date, no information was available about the
composition of shareholders of Belgian listed ﬁrms.
2.1 Main Features
The Anglo-Saxon corporate system is characterized as oriented toward out-
side investors8, and is based on common law traditions, where the ownership
6For 27 wealthy economies including Belgium.
7In 75% of the cases the controlling large shareholder does not have another large share-
holder in the same ﬁrm.
8Franks and Mayer (1995) classify the ownership structures in outside and inside systems.
5is dispersed; the number of listed ﬁrms is large with few companies related
by pyramids, the market is liquid and there is a market for corporate control
disciplining bad management. In contrast, the corporate sector in continental
Europe is characterized by civil law traditions, and is oriented towards inside
investors, with a small number of listed companies compared to the size of
the economy; the ownership is more concentrated and complex with pyramidal
structures, and the ﬁrms are linked by cross shareholding. These interlocked
companies deter any attempt of hostile takeovers by outsiders [Crama et al,
(1999)]. Belgian corporations appear to ﬁt this model well. In particular, they
are characterized by the concentration of ownership9, the illiquidity of the eq-
uity market with a small number of listed companies. It was shown in Becht’s
(1999) empirical analysis for German and Belgian stock markets, that the voting
power concentration through blocks has a negative eﬀect on market liquidity.
Other characteristics are the weakness of the market for corporate control10,
and the prominence of holding companies or family groups with a high degree
of interlocked ﬁrms, which are used to lever control via an indirect and com-
plex structure of pyramids. Wymeersch (1994) argued that the most important
reason for the use of pyramids in Belgium is leverage (see Renneboog (1996,
1997), for an overview). In addition we should note the presence of the voting
blocks in listed companies, that is blocks of shareholders who declare that they
are acting in concert.
Another feature of Belgian corporations is the linkage of many ﬁrms to the
coordination-centers, for tax advantages. For example the members of a group
which are related to a coordination-center can borrow from it (or it can be used
to transfer funds from one member to another) with a signiﬁcant tax advantage,
compared to borrowing from a ﬁnancial intermediary. To illustrate this mode of
ﬁnancing we borrow an example used by Deloof and Verschuren (1999). Assume
that we have two ﬁrms (ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2) which are members of a group. Firm
1 can invest either borrowed or internal funds in the coordination-center. Then
the coordination-center lends these funds to ﬁrm 2. When ﬁrm 2 pays the
interest expenses to the coordination-center, these costs are deduced from her
tax base, and the coordination-center does not have to pay taxes on its interest
income (which comes from ﬁrm 2). At the end of this chain, the dividends paid
by the coordination-center to the investing ﬁrm 1 are almost tax-exempt.
The many diﬀerences in the nature of corporate ownership in the anglo-
Saxon countries and continental European countries suggest that our results
may be diﬀerent from those found for U.S. ﬁrms.
9This constatation is also presented in the conclusion of the ECGN’s work on blockholdings
in Europe, where it is stated that the voting power is highly concentrated in continental Europe
(see for instance Becht and R¨ oell (1999)).
10This does not mean that there is no discipline of bad managers, but the takeover is
very hard to implement especially after the adoption of the ”Royal Decree” in 1989. [see for
instance Renneboog (2000), and Dherment-Fr` ere et al, (2001)].
62.2 Disclosure Law
Prior to 1989 little was known about the Belgian corporate ownership and the
identity of shareholders. It is after the takeover of one of the largest Belgian
groups, ”la Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale de Belgique” that the Belgian ownership disclo-
sure law was adopted. In 1988, there was a takeover battle between the French
”Compagnie Financi` ere de Suez” and the Benedetti group for the ownership
of the ”Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale de Belgique”. The initial bid by the Italian Carlo
de Benedetti failed, and ultimately the company was bought by the French
”Companie de Suez”. The consequence of this takeover was to put control of a
large percentage of the Belgian economy in the hands of non-Belgian interests
(Wymeersch, 1994)11. The 1989 disclosure law makes notiﬁcation, to the Bank-
ing Commission, mandatory for all shareholding of 5 percent12 or multiples of 5
percent. The notiﬁcation threshold may be as low as 3 percent if the company
writes this into its statutes. However, there are exceptions where voting blocks
below the 5 percent(or 3 percent) threshold lead to notiﬁcation. First, if the
owners previously had an ownership of 5 percent, or more, and reduced it below
5 percent. Second, the notiﬁcation takes into account stocks and warrants. If
the investor holds for example 1 percent of equities and 4 percent of warrants,
he must notify the company. Third, when a shareholder leaves a voting pact,
he is required to register this change.
The law applies to the direct owners of the voting rights, as well as to those
investors who control voting rights indirectly via a pyramidal structure of inter-
mediate companies. Investors are obliged to reveal whether they are aﬃliated
to a group of companies or whether they act in concert with other investors. All
the dispositions taken by this law reinforce the position of controlling sharehold-
ers who are in most cases minority controlling shareholders. Furthermore, the
takeover bids were strictly regulated by the Royal Decree of 8th November 1989,
reducing the possibility of takeovers as a means to disciplining bad managers.
Another disposition taken by this law is that when the stake of an investor
(or of the investors belonging to the same investor group) reaches 20 percent of
the voting rights of the company, the strategic policy with regard to the target
has to be declared to the banking commission and the target. A supermajority
of 75 percent of the voting rights at the general assembly is needed to make
decisions about changes in the acts of incorporation, increases of the equity
capital, limitations or changes in the preferential rights of existing shareholders
to purchase shares in new equity issues, changes in the rights of diﬀerent classes
of shareholders, repurchases of shares, and changes in the legal form of the
corporation.
1130 percent according some sources (Wymeersch, 1994).
12This is the case in most other European countries, but in Italy it is 2 percent.
7The disclosure law of 1989 was supplemented by the law of 18th June 1991,
which gives more protection to the controlling shareholders. They obtained in-
struments to entrench their position and protect themselves from hostile takeover.
”These instruments are based on a reinforcement of their shareholder position,
without imposing the acquisition of a full majority.”13 Also, with this law minor-
ity shareholders or a group of minority shareholders owning at least 1% of shares
with a value of not less than BEF 50 million, can appoint one or more experts
who can scrutinize the company’s accounting and its internal operations. Share-
holders owning at least 1% of the votes can initiate a minority claim against the
directors for the beneﬁt of the company, if it can be proven that the company’s
managers have managed it poorly and if the minority shareholders have voted
against the directors’ discharge at the annual meeting.
3 Empirical Methodology
In our estimation we regress Tobin’s Q, as a measure of performance, on own-
ership variables and a number of control variables. In a ﬁrst estimation the
ownership variable consists in managerial ownership variable, and in a second
estimation of the largest shareholders ownership variable. We focus on these
two ownership variables in order to see what would be the eﬀect of managers’
as well as the largest’s shareholders ownership on performance. The use of the
largest shareholders’ ownership is motivated by a distinguishing feature of Bel-
gian listed ﬁrms, i.e. the high level of ownership concentration. A more detailed
deﬁnition of ownership variables is given in section six. The control variables
consist of:
The log of the replacement cost (LORC), a proxy for size.
Financial Fixed Assets (FARC), it is the investment in the ﬁxed ﬁnancial
assets divided by the replacement cost to be compatible with Q. This variable
is introduced because of the high proportion of the ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets in the
Belgian listed ﬁrms’ balance sheet.
Long term debts (DBRC), the long term debt divided by the replacement
cost to be compatible with Q.
Research and development (RDRC), Research and development expenses
divided by the replacement cost to be compatible with Q.
Coordinate Centres (CC),it is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the ﬁrm is
related to a coordinate center and 0 otherwise. A ﬁrm which is linked to a
coordinate-center could beneﬁt from a high range of tax advantages.
Following the empirical studies done for U.S. corporations [Morck, et al.
(1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) among others], we use a cross-
sectional model to estimate the relationship between ﬁrms’ performance and
their ownership structure (management ownership and the largest sharehold-
ers’ ownership). In a second step, we use panel data to test the robustness of
13Wymeersch (1994).
8the results obtained cross-sectionally, and to check whether the model is not
misspeciﬁed.
Several criticisms were formulated against the cross-sectional models used in
most all US empirical studies to estimate the relationship between ﬁrms’ per-
formance and ownership structure. Himmelberg et al. (1999) used panel data,
that allowed them to estimate the importance of unobserved (time-invariant)
ﬁrm eﬀects. They use the same speciﬁcations as in Morck, et al. (1988) and
McConnell and Servaes (1990). Their results show that a large fraction of the
cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity. This unobserved heterogeneity generates a spurious corre-
lation between ownership and performance. They apply instrumental variables
estimation as an alternative to ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the endogeneity of
managerial ownership in the Q regression. Their results conﬁrm a large and
statistically signiﬁcant inverse-U relation between ownership and ﬁrm value.
However, they recognize the weakness of the instrumental variables used. Short
(1994) presented a survey of the literature on the eﬀect of the ownership com-
position on performance. She argued that the potential eﬀects of the structure
of ownership of the ﬁrm cannot be assessed in a comprehensive manner with-
out taking into account the ﬁnancial structures of the ﬁrm, especially the debt
structure. Concerning the econometric models she concluded that although the
cross-sectional analysis are useful, they cannot capture the dynamic of the rela-
tionship between ownership structure and performance. In order to track this
relationship over time, she suggested the use of panel data sets.
B¨ orsch and K¨ oke (2000) treat the econometric problems present in empirical
corporate governance studies. They show, that the use of cross-sectional data
does not allow to correct for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity. First, they stress on
the fact, that there would be structural reverse causality and unobserved ﬁrm
heterogeneity. To deal with this problem, they propose the use of panel data
which are necessary for the identiﬁcation of any singular corporate governance
mechanism. Panel data can provide for instruments that are not available in
cross-sectional data. Second, they discuss the problem of missing variables due
to data availability or lack of knowledge about functional forms. The third
problem is the sample selectivity, when we take into account, for example, only
the largest ﬁrms which could bias the results. And fourth, the measurement
error in variables.
In this study we ﬁrst use cross-sectional estimation from 1991 to 1996. The
model estimated cross-sectionally is:
qit = ® + ¯xi + ²i (1)
where qit is the measure of performance, i.e. Tobin’s Q.
9xi includes in our ﬁrst estimation managerial ownership variables and the x
control variables deﬁned above. In a second estimation it includes the largest
shareholders ownership variables and the x control variables.
²i is the error term, assumed to be uncorrelated with xi.
In a second step, we use panel data estimation to control whether the results
found cross-sectionally are not due to unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity which is not
captured cross-sectionally. The advantage of a panel data set over cross-section
ones is that it allows greater ﬂexibility in modelling diﬀerences in behavior
across individuals. Furthermore, it makes it possible to explain why a given
unit behaves diﬀerently at diﬀerent time14. We estimate the same model as in
(1) but in panel data as:
qit = ®i + ¯xit + ²it; (2)
where xit includes ownership variables (either managerial ownership vari-
ables or largest shareholders ownership variables) and the x control variables
deﬁned above.
®i is the individual eﬀect, which is constant over time t and speciﬁc to the
individual cross-sectional unit i. It captures the eﬀects of those variables that
are speciﬁc to the i-th ﬁrm and are constant over time.
When we consider the ®i as N ﬁxed unknown parameters, the model in (2)
is referred to as a ﬁxed eﬀects model. In the ﬁxed eﬀects model, the intercept
terms vary over the individual ﬁrms i. ®i may be correlated with xit.
where ²it v IID(0;¾2
²). With the assumption that all xit are independent
of all ²it.
When we assume that ®i are IID random factors we can write the random
eﬀects model as:
qit = ¹ + ¯xit + ®i + ²it (3)
Where (®i + ²it) is the error term consisting of two components:
®i v IID(0;¾2
®): It is an individual speciﬁc component, that does not vary
over time.
²it v IID(0;¾2
²): It is ²it is a remainder component, that is assumed to be
uncorrelated over time.
This means that all correlation of the error terms over time is attributed to
the individual eﬀects ®i.
It is assumed that ®i and ²it are mutually independent and independent of
xjs (for all j and s). This implies that the OLS estimator for ¹ and ¯ from
(3) is unbiased and consistent. The error components structure implies that
14See Greene (1997) and Verbeek (2000).
10the composite error term ®i + ²it exhibits a particular form of autocorrelation
(unless ¾2
® = 0).
In order to choose between ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects or random eﬀects, we rely on
the Hausman statistic and the Lagrange Multiplier statistic.
Hausman Statistic: Hausman (1978) considers a test for the null hypoth-
esis that xit and ®i are uncorrelated. The Hausman test consists in comparing
two estimators. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimator b ¯FE which is consistent for ¯ irre-
spective of the question whether xit and ®i are uncorrelated, while the random
eﬀects estimator b ¯RE is consistent and eﬃcient only if xit and ®i are not corre-
lated.
The test for the null hypothesis of independent ®i’s is to consider the diﬀer-
ence between the two estimators b q = b ¯FE ¡ b ¯RE. With no misspeciﬁcation, b q
should be near zero.
Using the lemma in Hausman (1978), V (b q) = V (b ¯FE) ¡ V (b ¯RE)
consequently, the Hausman test statistic is:
³H = (b ¯FE ¡ b ¯RE)0[b V (b ¯FE) ¡ b V (b ¯RE)]¡1(b ¯FE ¡ b ¯RE)
where b V s denote estimates of the true covariance matrices.
If the random eﬀects model is correct the two estimates should be near each
other. An important reason why the two estimators would be diﬀerent is the
existence of correlation between xit and ®i:
Under the null hypothesis, the statistic ³H has an asymptotic Â2(K) distri-
bution, where K is the number of elements in ¯.
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic: Breusch and Pagan (1980) have derived
a Lagrange Multiplier test for the random eﬀects model based on the OLS
residuals.Under the null hypothesis ¾2
® = 0 (the alternative hypothesis is ¾2
® 6=
0).

















Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as Â2(1).
Using the Hausman and LM statistic, we can consider which model is more
suitable to estimate, and which one is misspeciﬁed. As we are interested in
the eﬀect of management and largest shareholders’ equity ownership on ﬁrms’
performance, we run ﬁrst, an OLS regression of management ownership on Q.
Second, we run the same regression with the largest shareholders ownership.
This is done cross-sectionally, and afterwards in panel. In the panel data es-
timation we run a pooled OLS regression, then depending on the outcome of
the Hausman and Lagrange Multiplier statistics, we allow for ﬁxed eﬀects or
random eﬀects.
114 Measure of Performance: Tobin’s Q
In our study we use Tobin’s Q as a measure of the Belgian listed ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance. Lindenberg & Ross (1981) stressed that ”ﬁnancial price data provide a
viewing window into the ﬁrm through the market’s valuation of the securities is-
sued by the ﬁrm and the changes in these values over time. Accounting data, on
the other hand, provide information on the resources used by the ﬁrms”15. The
comparison between the two oﬀers the opportunity to examine performance.
Our study is innovative at the Belgian and European level. Indeed, to our
knowledge, no study before computed Tobin’s Q at ﬁrm level neither in Bel-
gium nor elsewhere in Europe, except one [Dherment-Fr` ere et al, (2001)] but
they used the ratio of the market value to the total assets without correcting
the historical values at their replacement costs. This is quite surprising given
the number of U.S. studies, which used this measure at the ﬁrm level.
Lindenberg & Ross (1981) were the precursors in the computation of Tobin’s
Q at ﬁrm level. They developed a method to compute Tobin’s Q and took it
as a measure of bound for monopoly rents. More details on the method they
used are provided in their paper. Their task was somewhat easier than us,
because of the availability of data on US listed ﬁrms, especially concerning the
replacement cost which was available from 1976 to 1986. In 1976 the SEC
required large companies to disclose replacement cost data. For periods prior
to 1976 Lindenberg & Ross developed a recursive model. Authors interested
in the measure of ﬁrm performance and/or monopoly rents and power of ﬁrms
followed Lindenberg & Ross computation. In general the method is modiﬁed in
order to facilitate computations, according to the availability of data.
Perfect & Wiles (1994) explore the Lindenberg & Ross (1981) framework by
comparing ﬁve methods of Q computation. They developed a method which
they called L&R modiﬁed method to avoid some diﬃculties with data availabil-
ity.
Tobin’s Q is deﬁned as:
Tobin’s Q= Market Value of the Firm
Replacement Cost of Firm assets
To compute values of Tobin’s Q we have to calculate the two components of
the fraction, the market value and the replacement cost.
15Lindenberg and Ross (1981), p1.
124.1 The Market Value (MV)
The market value is the sum of the common stocks, preferred stocks and long
term debts.
The common stocks are the recorded year end value of the ﬁrm’s common
stocks, provided from the Brussels stock exchange. We follow Lang, Stulz, and
Walking (1989) in using the preferred stocks at their book value. In our sam-
ple there are only three ﬁrms which have preferred stocks (Recticel, Cockerill-
Sambre and Her-Fic).
In this study the long term debts are at their book value. Gheysens et al.
(1979) in a comparison of the nominal value of a sample of Belgian outstanding
bonds at their market value, show that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the two. This suggests that it may not be unreasonable to use the nominal
value of debt as a proxy for the market value. For long term bonds, Lang et al.
(1989), took the prices of long term bonds obtained from Moody’s Bond Record
and Standard and Poor’s Bond Guide when it is available, and the book value
otherwise. If the price of a non convertible bond is not reported, the yield to
maturity and coupon rate issued by the same ﬁrm are used to calculate the price
of the bond. Bonds with a remaining maturity of less than one year, short-term
bonds, and debt with an unknown coupon and/or maturity date are valued at
book value. Anyway, it was impossible for us to distinguish in the ﬁrms’ balance
sheet (from the NBB16 CD ROM’s) the bonds from long term debts.
4.2 The Replacement Cost (RC)
The assets of a ﬁrm are of three categories: plant and equipment, inventories,
and other assets.
As in Lindenberg & Ross (1981) the replacement cost is:
RCt = TAt + RNPt - HNPt + RINVt -HINVt
Where:
TAt : Total assets in year t
RNPt :Net plant at replacement cost in year t
HNPt : Net plant at historical value in year t
RINVt : Inventories at replacement cost in year t
HINVt : Inventories at historical value in year t
The value of inventories in Lindenberg and Ross (1981)
Depends upon the accounting methods used by the ﬁrm to evaluate its in-
ventories.
16National Bank of Belgium.
13Last In , First Out. Under this method the last items purchased are assumed
to be the ﬁrst ones sold. This method underestimates the replacement cost of
inventory in inﬂationary periods. The formula used by L&R (1981) provides an











Where pt is the wholesales price index reported in the Business Conditions
Digest.
First In, First Out. This method implies that the ﬁrst inventories items are
sold ﬁrst. Inventories are carried on the ﬁrm’s books at the most recent prices.
A reasonable approximation is given by:
RINVt = HINVt
Average Cost Method. The inventories reported at time t is approximately







Retail Cost Method. Inventories are valued at the expected retail prices.
RINVt = HINVt(Wholesale Price Index/Retail Price Index)
Because of the diﬃculty of obtaining complete information about the method
used by each Belgian listed ﬁrm to evaluate its inventories, we assume that the
RINVt is equal to HINVt, so in our framework the RCt becomes:
RCt = TAt + RNPt - HNPt
TAt is obtained from the balance sheet of each ﬁrm ,
HNPt is obtained from the balance sheet of each ﬁrm ,
RNPt is computed.














µt : is the year rate of cost-reducing technical progress. We assume that:
µt = 0
Perfect & Willes (1994), Lang , Stulz, and Walking (1989), Lang and Litzen-
berg (1989), Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) assumed that the rate of
cost-reducing technical progress equal to zero.
±t =
Book Depreciation of year t
HNPt-1
Át is the investment deﬂator calculated from data available from the Federal
Planning Bureau.
For the ﬁrst period we consider RNPt¡1 equal to HNPt as in Perfect and
Willes (1994) .
It is the new investment in plant and equipment in year t.
In Table 2, in the appendix, we have descriptive statistics of Q for all listed
ﬁrms (except insurance companies, banks and some ﬁrms in coal and mining,
which are not included in our sample) for which we have all available data.
5 Data Sources
Our data consists of all ﬁrms that satisfy the following criteria:
1. Belgian listed ﬁrms except banks and insurance companies.
2. Belgian listed ﬁrms for which the balance sheet data is available in the
data set of the National Bank of Belgium.
3. Belgian listed ﬁrms for which ownership data is available in annual re-
ports, (or in the notiﬁcations that are available in the Documentation and
Statistics Department at the Brussels Stock exchange) with at least one
shareholder beyond the 5% (or 3%) declaration threshold.
5.1 Ownership data
As we saw in the previous section, before 1989 there is no ownership data
available and little was known about Belgian corporate ownership. Since the
disclosure law in 1989, large shareholder ownership is reported to the Banking
Commission and is reported in the companies’ annual reports. However, there
is no taped database which allows a direct use of this data. This was the main
diﬃculty of this study.
15Our data sample consists of all Belgian non ﬁnancial companies listed on
the Brussels Stock Exchange, for which ﬁnancial data is available in the data
set mentioned by the National Bank of Belgium. It should be noted that this
excludes some companies in coal mining and steel production. These ﬁrms
were involved in a long liquidation process during which they were still listed.
To summarize, our sample consists of all listed ﬁrms with available ownership
data and accounting data from NBB CD-ROMs making it possible to compute
Tobin’s Q. In some other cases there are ﬁrms with no declaration about their
ownership structure because there is no shareholder who has more than 5 percent
(or 3 percent) of equity shares. Other ﬁrms are mentioned on the CD-ROMs but
there is no data reported in their balance sheets. The sample was more reduced
in 1989 and 1990 because of ﬁrms which beneﬁted from a ”grace period”. Indeed,
in the disclosure law of 1989, there is a disposition for some ﬁrms which were
not obliged to do any declaration at the end of 1989. These ﬁrms are those
which enjoyed a ”grace period” for two years (1989 and 1990), but by the end
of 1991 they were obliged to do such declarations. The condition for the ﬁrm
to enjoy the ”grace period” is to have less than BEF 250000000 equity capital
at the time the legislation came into eﬀect. In order to have a more complete
sample, we began our empirical estimations in 1991.
Direct ownership data was collected from the annual reports of listed ﬁrms
and we complete this by information available in BBL and notiﬁcations avail-
able in the Documentation and Statistics Department of the Brussels Stock
Exchange. In the Documentation and Statistics Department there exists an
updated database called BDPart. However when there is a change in the own-
ership composition, the previous data is overwritten. Therefore this database
does not allow a study on historical data. To have all historical ownership po-
sitions it is necessary to complete them manually, from annual reports. We
should note that there exists a database provided by the NBB in the annual
accounts CD-ROMs. However, this data is incomplete. Only Belgian share-
holders are reported. If there are foreign shareholders, there is no indication
about them. Furthermore a comparison of the printed annual reports and CD-
ROMs revealed that the portfolio information is frequently faulty17. We should
also note that the ECGN report of the European Commission (1997) addresses
the main diﬃculties in obtaining ownership and/or control information. Al-
though the EU Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC), the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and
8th company Directives, the Financial Institutions and Bank Accounting Direc-
tive (91/674/EEC) were adopted in order to harmonize the disclosure standards
in the EU and to make the information available. The collection of data remains
diﬃcult and there is little alternative to construct the data set manually as we
have done in this study. Table 1, in the appendix, reports the number of ﬁrms
included in our sample and those excluded.
17See for example the ECGN report to the European Commission (1997).
165.2 Data Sources for the Computation of Tobin’s Q
Our data sources to compute Tobin’s Q are:
1. The CD-ROMs’ edited by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB).
2. Brussels Stock Exchange.
3. Federal Planning Bureau.
To compute Tobin’s Q we combine data from ﬁrms’ balance sheets and data
concerning the market value of ﬁrms. For data from balance sheets we use the
NBB CD-ROM’s which provides us with data concerning total assets, historical
value of plants, the book depreciation of plants, and the long term debt. There
are some ﬁrms which are recorded on the CD-ROMs but no data is available
about them; these ﬁrms are excluded.
The data needed to calculate the market value was collected from the Brus-
sels Stock Exchange, where we have the year end market capitalization of com-
mon stocks and preferred stocks if there are any.
From the Federal Planning Bureau we obtained data to calculate the invest-
ment deﬂator.
6 Empirical Results
First we consider, the management direct ownership. Second, we look at the
largest shareholders’ (or voting blocks) direct ownership in order to check the
eﬀect of ownership concentration on ﬁrm performance. Finally, we consider the
second largest shareholders’ (or voting blocks) direct ownership.
6.1 The Management Ownership
To deﬁne the managerial ownership variable, we have to take into account how
the diﬀerent shareholders of a ﬁrm vote. In Belgian listed ﬁrms the shareholding
could be of independent shareholders, that is direct stakes, or group blocks
which represent the stakes of companies that are part of a business group that
is subject to consolidation rules under Belgian law. Hence, an investor could
be an individual or an investor who is a member of a voting pact. Managers
also could have an individual direct shareholding in the ﬁrm as they could be
members of a voting pact, and they declare that they are acting in concert
with other shareholders. Because of the existence of voting pacts, we deﬁne the
management ownership variable (the variable INS in our regression estimation)
as the share of common stocks owned by the manager if he does not declare that
he acts in concert with others. If the manager declares that he acts in concert
17with other shareholders, INS is the sum of the manager’s common stocks and
the common stocks held by the other shareholder(s) in the same voting pact.
The motivation for this deﬁnition, is that the manager who is a member
of a voting pact is linked to the other members. There will be an inﬂuence,
either by him on the other voting pact’s members, as he could be inﬂuenced by
them, because there is an arrangement to vote together. If we take only the
manager’s equity ownership, we are assuming that only his ownership has an
eﬀect on decisions made. But this is not true because when he votes, it is not
only his ownership which is considered, but the ownership of all the members
of the voting pact to which he belongs. Descriptive statistics on management
ownership are in Table 3, in the appendix.
As mentioned above, we use ﬁrst a cross-sectional estimation to see the
predictable eﬀects of the ownership structure of a ﬁrm on its value, following
the empirical literature [McConnel and Servaes (1990), and Morck et al,. (1988)
for instance]. We estimate an ordinary least square regression of Tobin’s Q on
management ownership. Results are shown in Table 8, in the appendix. In
this table INS is the percentage of the equity shares held by insiders as deﬁned
above. Second, we use panel data to estimate the same relationship, in order to
check wether the previous results are not spurious and due to ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Cross-sectionally, the results shown in Table 8, indicate a negative relation-
ship between management ownership and ﬁrm value. The results are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for all periods except for 1991 and 1996 where they are less
signiﬁcant. For 1991 the level of signiﬁcance is 8% , and in 1996 it is 12%.
This inverse relationship between Tobin’s Q and managers ownership is con-
sistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis, and indicates that in
Belgian listed companies, there is no convergence of interest between managers
and other shareholders. Our results are consistent with the recent literature on
corporate governance and law where it is reported that weak legal shareholder
protection aﬀects the ease with which the manager, possibly in collusion with
the large shareholders can divert corporate resources [Burkart et al., (1997)]. In
our sample, managers are in many cases part of voting blocks, which suggests,
that there could be a collusion between them to expropriate minority share-
holders. The lack of the liquidity of the capital market weakens the market for
corporate control in Belgium, hence weakens the discipline of bad managers by
the market. Becht (1999) showed that the high level of ownership concentration
has a negative eﬀect on market liquidity. In the Belgian case, this is reinforced
by the disclosure law and the regulation of takeover bids after the takeover of
”la Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale de Belgique” which have further reduced the eﬀectiveness
of takeovers as a mechanism of corporate control and management discipline,
as mentioned in previous sections. The lack of a real threat from the market of
corporate control18 helps managerial discretion19.
18With regard to changes in takeover procedures brougth by the Royale Decree of 08/11/89.
19This does not mean that there is no discipline of managers [Renneboog(2000) for instance].
18We now introduce the control variables, deﬁned in previous sections, which
could capture some features in the ﬁrms’ contracting environment as well as spe-
cial features of Belgian corporate ownership. The results, are no longer statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in the cross-sectional estimation. The coeﬃcient on managerial
ownership is still negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that
there is a correlation between the error term and these explanatory variables.
To control for ﬁrm heterogeneity we use panel data. The results in columns
one and two of Table 11, in the appendix, show a negative relationship between
managerial ownership and ﬁrm value in the pooled form, and also with random
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects (the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects results are not reported in this
table). According to the Hausman statistic, random eﬀects have to be included.
The sign of the management ownership coeﬃcient is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant.
Columns three and four of Table 11 report the results of the regression of
managerial ownership, other control variables, and year dummies (not reported)
on ﬁrms’ value. The LM and Hausman statistical tests reject random eﬀects
model in favor of ﬁxed eﬀects model. In the estimation with ﬁrm ﬁxed ef-
fects, the coeﬃcient on ownership is negative but not signiﬁcant, and for the
other control variables there is only the coeﬃcient on size which is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. In the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects we did not
introduce the dummy variable of coordinate-center, because it is time invariant.
These results could be explained by the fact that there could be other unob-
served variables, in the Belgian context, which interact with the management
ownership variable and are not introduced here.
Some Belgian corporate ownership characteristics have to be considered to
get suﬃcient conclusions about the results obtained. In the Belgian case it
could be that it is not only ownership variables that make managers align their
interests to those of other shareholders, or make them entrench themselves. First
of all, the sample of ﬁrms with managerial ownership is quite small. Second,
in most all cases the listed ﬁrms are ultimately in the hands of a family, and
managers even if they do not have direct ownership in the ﬁrm, are generally
family members. It would be that managers get other forms of compensations,
which should be accounted for. Another element is that, we ﬁnd the same
managers in diﬀerent ﬁrms. So, it is the same person who is in a number of
ﬁrms as a manager, which could create a link between these ﬁrms and could
have an eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ value. We think that all these elements have to
be considered, in order to understand the results obtained and to have a clear
idea on the moral hazard problems in Belgian ﬁrms. Everything we state in this
paragraph, is based on casual observation from Belgian corporate governance,
it would be interesting to include them in empirical estimation if there is any
available data.
We tried to use other functional forms on the performance indicator, like
19piecewise speciﬁcation or quadratic speciﬁcation, but the results were not sig-
niﬁcant.
6.2 Ownership Concentration
6.2.1 The First Largest Shareholder
The ownership concentration is reﬂected in the small number of shareholders
in the same ﬁrm, and the large percentage of shares held by them. A small
fraction of shares is left to dispersed shareholders.
As for manager ownership, the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm could be an
individual investor or a member of a voting block, that is several shareholders
declare that they are acting in concert. Hence, the variable we consider for the
largest shareholder could be the equity ownership of an individual shareholder
or it could be the sum of the voting rights of the shareholders in the same
voting pact. Our ﬁrst deﬁnition of the largest shareholder follows the prediction
of Zwiebel’s (1995) study, where the ownership of the largest shareholder is
deﬁned as a function of the ownership of other shareholders around him. In a
second deﬁnition, we consider the ﬁrst largest shareholder without considering
what it represents in the all declared ownership. He is the shareholder who has
the greatest equity ownership in the ﬁrm.
Under the assumption of divisible control beneﬁts, Zwiebel (1995) develops a
theoretical model explaining why many investors choose to hold a large block of
equity in the same ﬁrm. With an empirical application to US data, he conﬁrms
his model’s predictions. The model predicts, ﬁrst, that large investors ”create
their own space”. In other words, the presence of a large block in the ﬁrm
dissuades other large blocks to locate in the same ﬁrm. Second, the model
predicts a clientele eﬀect in the shareholder structure, in the sense that, the
larger the ﬁrst investor the smaller would be the number of the other investors
in the same ﬁrm. Following the prediction of the clientele eﬀect in Zwiebel’s
(1995) model, we consider the power of investors as a function of one another.
We discriminate between shareholders using their relative size. We consider a
ﬁrm as having a concentrated ownership if the largest shareholder has 50% of
all declared ownership. So, our selection criterion is to consider the percentage
of the largest shareholder if his shareholding represents more than 50% of all
declared ownership. The ﬂoat is considered as constituted of a large number of
small voters. The total number of shares is normalized to the shares held by
the declared shareholders as in Crama et al., (1999). This selection criterion
is to put more distance between the ﬁrst largest shareholder and the followers
if there are any. Following the dispersion of the equity ownership in the ﬁrm,
the inﬂuence of the largest shareholder would be diﬀerent. The power of the
largest shareholder depends on the percentage of the votes he has, but also on
the votes detained by the other shareholders around him in the same ﬁrm.
20According to what is stated above we deﬁne the largest shareholder (or
voting block) variable (LSH) as the percentage of the largest shareholder in the
ﬁrm, if his equity ownership represents more than 50% of all declared ownership
according to the Belgian law on ownership disclosure.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present statistical evidence on the high level of ownership
concentration, and show that the control by a large investor (or a voting pact)
is the common rule in almost all Belgian ﬁrms. For all periods around 92% of
ﬁrms have a large investor detaining more than 50% of all declared equities.
As for management ownership we estimate a cross-sectional relationship be-
tween the largest shareholders (or voting blocks) ownership and ﬁrm’s value as
expressed by Tobin’s Q. Results obtained from this regression show a negative
linear and signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁrm’s performance and the largest
shareholders’ (voting blocks) equity ownership. Regression results are shown in
Table 9, in the appendix.
This inverse relationship indicates the negative eﬀect of ownership concen-
tration on ﬁrms performance, and reveal that there will be an expropriation
exercised by large shareholders at the cost of small shareholders.
We introduce other variables to control whether the previous results are not
due to a spurious correlation between the largest shareholders (voting blocks)
ownership and Q. Results are shown in Table 10. The relationship between the
largest shareholders (voting blocks) and Tobin’s Q is not aﬀected by the intro-
duction of additional control variables and is always negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, except for 1994 and 1995. However, the other control variables are
not signiﬁcant for all periods. It suggests that there would be a correlation
between the error term and the other exogenous variables. To control if these
results are due to ﬁrm heterogeneity, we use a panel data model. We run a
regression with only the largest shareholder variables and year dummies. The
Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman statistics indicate that we have to include
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The results are in columns one and two of Table 12. These
results show that in the pooled form there is an inverse relationship, but with
the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects this relation is positive. The inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
improves R2 from 5.67% to 81.34%. However, the p-value on the largest share-
holders coeﬃcient in the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects is not signiﬁcant.
After the introduction of control variables the results with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on ownership is positive and signiﬁ-
cant. These results indicate that there is an interaction between the ownership
variable and the other control variables, which have an eﬀect on performance.
They also indicate that there is ﬁrm heterogeneity which was not captured in
the cross-sectional model.
21The relationship between the ownership of the largest shareholders and ﬁrms’
value is positive. Hence, the ownership concentration is not so bad for ﬁrm per-
formance. Although the literature on corporate governance and law indicates
that large shareholders could expropriate small shareholders, this may be the
case if we could consider all the forms this expropriation takes. This literature
also reports, that the large shareholders could have a monitoring role to enforce
value maximization. Here we are considering the eﬀect of ownership concentra-
tion on ﬁrm’s value, and it seems reasonable that those who have the largest
stakes in the ﬁrm want their value to increase.
The investment in ﬁxed ﬁnancial assets variable is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. This variable represents the investment in the aﬃliated ﬁrms, other
ﬁrms linked by participating interests, and other ﬁnancial assets.
The coeﬃcient on long term debt is positive and signiﬁcant. In Deloof (1999),
it was found that the ﬁrm which is part of a holding will have higher debt
level than others. It would be interesting to see the eﬀect of the debts coming
from group members and the eﬀect of the debts coming from outside the group.
Unfortunately in our data it is impossible to see the origin of debts. However, the
positive relationship between debt and Q is consistent with the leverage signaling
conjecture [Ross (1977)] and the free-cash ﬂow argument [Jensen (1986)].
Tobin’s Q is inversely correlated with ﬁrm’s size (LORC), and this is consis-
tent with the argument that larger ﬁrms would have lower Tobin’s Q.
The coeﬃcient on R&D is positive and signiﬁcant. This is consistent with
the argument that these expenses increase the value of the ﬁrm.
The dummy variable CC was not introduced in the regression with ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects, because it is time invariant.
In a second deﬁnition of the largest shareholder, we consider him as the
shareholder (or voting block) who has the largest percentage of equities in the
ﬁrm, without looking at what he represents in the all declared ownership. The
results obtained (but not reported here) are not diﬀerent from those when we
consider the largest shareholder as the one who has 50% of all declared own-
ership. This suggests that the ownership is so concentrated and the remaining
small number of ﬁrms where there is another shareholder who is not so far from
the ﬁrst one does not change the results obtained for the relationship between
ownership and Q.
As for management ownership we run a quadratic regression of LSH on Q.
The results were also not signiﬁcant.
226.2.2 The Second Largest Shareholder
We have seen that almost all listed ﬁrms have one dominant shareholder, few
ﬁrms have a second shareholder, and when he exists he has a small stake in the
ﬁrm. There are some exceptions for few ﬁrms which have a second shareholder
who has more than 10 percent of equity ownership. We considered the second
largest shareholder in ﬁrms where the ﬁrst largest shareholder has more than
50% of all declared equity shares. The second largest shareholder is the one who
has less than 50% of all declared ownership. Descriptive statistics are in Table
7, in the appendix.
Cross-sectionally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant results. However, panel data results,
in columns one and two of Table 13, a negative non signiﬁcant relationship
between ownership and Q show in the pooled form . In this table the second
largest shareholders variables is 2ndLSH. With ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects the relation is
positive and signiﬁcant. In this case there is also ﬁrm heterogeneity which was
not captured in the cross-sectional model. Columns three and four in Table 13
report results with control variables. In the pooled form the coeﬃcient on own-
ership is negative and not signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcients on the other control
variables are not signiﬁcant. Results are signiﬁcant when we take into account
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. They show that there is a positive relation between ownership
and ﬁrms’ value, and the other control variables are also signiﬁcant with the
predictable signs. Firms’ size is negative and signiﬁcant, the investment in ﬁ-
nancial assets is positive and signiﬁcant, and the same holds for the investment
in R&D.
In columns ﬁve and six of Table 13, we introduce the debt variable. In
the pooled form all coeﬃcients are non signiﬁcant. In the model with ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient on ownership is less signiﬁcant as before (9% level
of signiﬁcance, against 5% before), and the coeﬃcient on debt is positive and
signiﬁcant at only the 11% level.
We can conclude that the ownership of the second largest shareholders has
a positive eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s value. This may ﬁnd its explanation in the fact
that the interests of the second largest shareholders is to maximize their value or
because the ﬁrst largest shareholders exert suﬃcient control, that it is impossible
for the second to extract private beneﬁts.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the relationship between ownership structure of Bel-
gian listed ﬁrms and their performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. We explore ﬁrst
the relationship between management ownership and ﬁrms’ performance and
second, the relationship between the largest shareholders ownership and ﬁrms’
performance. In the empirical estimations we ﬁrst use cross-sectional estima-
tions. Afterwards, we use panel data to check for ﬁrm heterogeneity, and to see
23whether the cross-sectional model is not misspeciﬁed. The results show that, in
most cases, the cross-sectional model is not the right one. The speciﬁcations we
used are all linear. We tried other functional forms like piecewise or quadratic
regressions, but the results were not signiﬁcant.
The relationship between Q and managerial ownership is negative. What
let us conclude that there is no convergence of interests between managers and
other shareholders. However, the introduction of control variables makes the
results non signiﬁcant. The same results were found cross-sectionally and in
panel data.
The relationship between Q and minority controlling shareholders is negative
and signiﬁcant cross-sectionally, but this model is misspeciﬁed. Indeed, the
statistical tests argue in favor of introducing ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. When ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects are introduced, the ownership and ﬁrms’ value are positively correlated.
The presence of large shareholders maximizes ﬁrm value.
The presence of a second largest shareholder is also positively correlated
with ﬁrms’ value. The results cross-sectionally are not signiﬁcant, while they
are in the panel data model.
If more data were available, we could take into account more elements that
determine the contracting environment of the Belgian context. This could help
clarify certain aspects of Belgian corporate ownership.
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28A The Sample Description and Descriptive Statis-
tics
A.1 The Sample Description
Table 1: Number of Firms in our Sample.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
All Listed Firms 168 160 157 152 142 138
Banks and Insurances
Companies Listed 14 14 12 11 11 10
Firms without data
on NBB CD-ROMs 3 5 7 10 8 6
Firms Listed without
Declaration of control 4 3 2 2 2 3
Firms in Coal and Mining 8 7 6 6 3 2
Firms with Q greater than 2.50 8 3 6 6 5 15
Firms left in our sample 131 128 124 117 113 102
A.2 Tobin’s Q Values
Table 2: Univariate Analysis of Tobin’s Q.
YEARS N MEAN STD.DEV MAX Q3 MED Q1 MIN
1991 131 1.029 0.443 2.467 1.232 0.980 0.728 0.211
1992 128 0.999 0.467 2.317 1.223 0.894 0.699 0.153
1993 124 1.134 0.481 2.494 1.420 1.049 0.831 0.013
1994 117 1.148 0.470 2.478 1.475 1.060 0.869 0.046
1995 113 1.127 0.464 2.447 1.350 1.053 0.831 0.119
1996 102 1.139 0.503 2.491 1.452 1.055 0.817 0.113
In our sample insurance companies, banks, some dying ﬁrms in cool and
mining, for which the balance sheets in NBB CR-Roms’ are not complete, are
omitted from the analysis. To obviate problems with outliers we deleted ﬁrms
with a Q greater than 2.50.
29A.3 Ownership Descriptive Statistics
Table 3: Univariate analysis of managerial ownership.
YEARS N MEAN STD.DEV MAX Q3 MED Q1 MIN
1991 21 31.350 28.624 99.39 52.19 18.59 7.61 4.79
1992 21 28.809 24.496 76.21 52.19 17.15 6.89 4.79
1993 22 33.292 27.458 93.29 59.79 27.34 7.61 4.79
1994 22 35.049 26.843 94.87 59.79 28.87 9.45 4.79
1995 21 34.762 28.696 94.87 60.47 31.75 6.89 1.70
1996 18 35.471 31.039 94.87 64.25 33.46 6.48 1.70
Table 4: Number of ﬁrms having a large shareholder owning more than 50% of
declared equity ownership.
Years Number of Number of The percentage of
ﬁrms considered ﬁrms with large number of ﬁrms having
in our sample shareholders a large shareholder
1991 131 122 93%
1992 128 118 92%
1993 124 116 94%
1994 117 109 93%
1995 113 102 90%
1996 102 97 95%
Table 5: Univariate Analysis of the equity holding of the ﬁrst largest shareholder
(or voting block), who detains more than 50% of all declared equities.
YEARS N MEAN STD.DEV MAX Q3 MED Q1 MIN
1991 125 57.131 19.726 99.39 69.92 55.09 45.97 11.3
1992 121 58.572 19.234 99.58 69.79 55.89 48.00 11.3
1993 120 59.26 18.726 99.75 70.21 57.05 47.84 10.87
1994 113 57.643 18.026 99.75 69.53 56.21 47.64 10.87
1995 107 58.33 17.77 95.67 70.00 56.85 47.64 15.06
1996 98 60.629 19.803 99.81 77.89 57.88 48.19 15.7
30Table 6: Univariate Analysis of the equity holding of the ﬁrst largest shareholder
(or voting block), without considering what it represents in all declared equities.
YEARS N MEAN STD.DEV MAX Q3 MED Q1 MIN
1991 130 55.535 20.589 99.39 69.72 54.78 43.73 11.3
1992 125 56.821 19.828 97.95 67.95 55.09 45.50 11.3
1993 121 58.338 19.377 99.75 70.00 56.75 46.94 10.87
1994 114 56.658 18.629 99.75 68.72 55.80 46.40 10.87
1995 111 56.164 19.26 95.67 69.79 55.89 44.69 10.87
1996 102 59.024 21.078 99.81 76.20 57.30 47.12 09.55
Table 7: Univariate analysis of the percentage of equity ownership of the second
shareholder
YEARS N MEAN STD.DEV MAX Q3 MED Q1 MIN
1991 52 9.525 7.805 42.79 10.90 7.02 5.09 0.32
1992 53 9.259 7.125 42.79 10.38 8.29 5.20 0.03
1993 54 9.740 8.152 42.79 10.41 7.83 5.00 0.03
1994 46 10.089 8.898 42.79 10.57 7.21 5.00 1.17
1995 41 9.995 10.002 42.79 10.38 6.07 4.92 0.24
1996 32 10.150 10.501 42.79 10.19 6.98 4.96 0.24
B Cross-Sectional Estimations
Table 8: OLS Regression of Q on Insiders Ownership (p values are in parenthe-
ses)
Variables 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Intercept 1.299 1.279 1.605 1.527 1.417 1.318
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
INS -0.007 -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006
(0.0818) (0.0290) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0254) (0.1231)
R-square 15.09% 22.70% 43.38% 39.11% 23.64% 14.21%
N 20 21 21 21 20 16
31Table 9: Regression of Q on Largest shareholder Ownership (p values are in
parentheses).
Variables 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Intercept 1.311 1.339 1.419 1.391 1.394 1.615
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
LSH -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008
(0.0186) (0.0133) (0.0462) (0.0933) (0.0830) (0.0022)
R-square 04.42% 05.04% 03.33% 02.52% 02.83% 09.32%
N 125 121 120 113 107 98
Table 10: OLS Regression of Q on Largest shareholder Ownership, Research
and Development, Financial Assets, Debts, Log of Replacement cost, and
coordinate-centers, (p values are in parentheses).
Variables 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Intercept 1.476 2.177 2.166 2.743 2.208 2.156
(0.0101) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0012)
LSH -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006
(0.0295) (0.0212) (0.0770) (0.1933) (0.2073) (0.0163)
RDRC -1.456 2.544 4.384 3.626 5.142 -7.127
(0.7805) (0.5598) (0.3326) (0.3458) (0.2160) (0.4560)
FARC 0.038 0.077 0.331 0.265 0.469 0.493
(0.7682) (0.5893) (0.0200) (0.0659) (0.0013) (0.0018)
DBRC 0.233 0.283 0.036 0.274 0.383 0.157
(0.5441) (0.4470) (0.9168) (0.4324) (0.2267) (0.6718)
LORC -0.027 -0.102 -0.108 -0.175 -0.128 -0.101
(0.6467) (0.0951) (0.0766) (0.0060) (0.0430) (0.1329)
CC 0.179 0.185 0.265 0.321 0.153 0.186
(0.1213) (0.1265) (0.0270) (0.0060) (0.1957) (0.1276)
N 125 121 120 113 107 98
R-square 07.35% 08.92% 11.95% 14.46% 15.43% 22.12%
B.1 Panel Data Estimations
B.1.1 Managerial Ownership
32Table 11: Panel data regression of ﬁrm value from 1991 to 1996, as a linear
function of listed explanatory variables. Intercept terms and year dummies are
included for all regressions, but not reported. (P-values are in parentheses).
Variables Pooled Random Eﬀects Pooled Firm Fixed Eﬀects
INS -0.00950 -0.00670 -0.00887 -0.00149









N 121 121 121 121
R-square 28.32% 86.92% 35.95% 92.38%
B.1.2 The First Largest Shareholders (or Voting Blocks) Ownership
33Table 12: Panel data regression of ﬁrm value from 1991 to 1996 as a linear
function of listed explanatory variables. Intercept terms and year dummies are
included for all regressions, but not reported. (P-values are in parentheses).
Variables Pooled Firm Fixed Eﬀects Pooled Firm Fixed Eﬀects
LSH -0.00529 0.0000150 -0.00461 0.00270









N 675 675 675 121
R-square 05.67% 81.34% 09.36% 85.15%
B.1.3 The Second Largest Shareholders (or Voting Blocks) Owner-
ship
34Table 13: Panel data regression of ﬁrm value from 1991 to 1996 as a linear
function of listed explanatory variables. Intercept terms and year dummies are
included for all regressions, but not reported. (P-values are in parentheses).
Variables Pooled Firm Fixed Pooled Firm Fixed Pooled Firm Fixed
Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects
2ndLSH -0.00410 0.00963 -0.00379 0.00814 -0.00352 0.00728
(0.1873) (0.0315) (0.2382) (0.0581) (0.2725) (0.0911)
LORC 0.0133 -0.228 0.000174 -0.247
(0.6915) (0.0039) (0.9959) (0.0019)
RDRC 8.841 36.097 5.201 34.637
(0.2453) (0.0028) (0.5073) (0.0040)
FARC 0.0389 0.384 0.0462 0.380
(0.6896) (0.0002) (0.6339) (0.0002)
DBRC 0.364 0.323
(0.0766) (0.1129)
N 270 270 270 270 270 270
R-square 04.33% 83.69% 05.45% 85.68% 06.19% 85.87%
35